

## Aides Shape Defense, Foreign Affairs Plans

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Ronald Reagan's advisers on foreign and defense policy, who believe in building up U.S. military strength against a growing Soviet threat, are talking about reducing the role of the National Security Council in a Republican administration.

The advisers are also considering ways to change the national intelligence system so that a wider range of assessments would reach the president than in today's tightly centralized arrangements.

And they are beginning to study U.S. military requirements for the next decade, although redirecting the massive military machine would be far harder than making bureaucratic changes.

Sixty-two persons are now listed as foreign policy advisers to the Republican presidential candidate, and 37 defense policy advisers are listed. Many of them are associated with institutions that are widely considered right-wing or have personal reputations as hawks.

A sampling of their statements and writings, and talks with some of them, show a strong desire to strengthen the armed forces. An apparent majority of them worry that this country has in the past two decades fallen behind the Soviet Union in military power.

But Richard V. Allen denies that the advisers' thinking is limited to the simple idea of building more weapons. He says the outlook in the Reagan camp goes deeper than that.

Allen is Reagan's principal coordinator in the fields of foreign and defense affairs. He plays a key role in the selection of advisers and thus the shaping of the counsel they give to the former California governor.

"The governor feels it would be nothing but irresponsible to wait until November to think about" the long-term policy problems that would confront him if he won the election, Allen said in an interview.

So, under Allen's supervision from his 16th Street office next to the Sheraton-Carlton, a number of advisers are working on studies. Some might become campaign speeches. Others could be used to answer questions — not only here but also from concerned Europeans.

# Reagan Advisers Eye Reduced Role for NSC

The studies range from such subjects as the relations that a President Reagan might have with the 97th Congress, to questions like whether the United States really needs an ability to defend the Persian Gulf region.

Some conclusions already seem firm in Allen's mind. One is the need to reduce what he sees as the domination of the administration's security apparatus by the NSC and its chief, the president's national security adviser.

The well advertised clashes between Zbigniew Brzezinski's NSC and former Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance's State Department "seem utterly pointless," Allen said, and the system should be revised to avoid such collisions in the future.

"The governor favors the strong secretary of state concept," according to Allen. Reagan would reduce the role of the NSC to an office that assigns jobs to other parts of the government, "but not try to sabotage or ride herd on the bureaucracy," Allen said, in an implied judgment on the way the system works now.

"You don't need to humiliate the national security adviser by removing his authority," Allen added. "He has a job to do as an honest broker" handling material from various executive departments. "But his job has to be one of managing the flow of information, not of policy formulation."

Allen says that what he now advocates was the original concept of the NSC and its chief, but it got distorted by presidential desires for a strong adviser close at hand and by strong personalities in the security adviser's job. How would Reagan check that tendency?

"I would imagine, on the basis of his experience as governor of California, that Reagan will govern through his Cabinet officers," Allen said. And, more pointedly, he added that Reagan would not do what Richard Nixon did in 1969.

Allen defines that experience as "going into the White House, locking the gate and assuming that the bureaucracy is of no practical value, so that all policy is made inside the White House." That is what made Henry A. Kissinger such a dominant figure as President Nixon's security adviser, Allen said.

Kissinger is also held responsible by several Reagan advisers for choking off alternative intelligence views. Some even accuse him of forcing intelligence to fit policy on such things as supporting detente in the early 1970s instead of paying enough attention to the Soviet military buildup.

"We need competing centers for national intelligence estimates, so there's a richer variety of views, rather than submerging points of view that should be heard," Allen said.

He suggested the resurrection of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board to evaluate what the intelligence professionals produce. It was abolished at the beginning of the Carter administration because, one hawkish observer commented, liberals regarded it as "a nest of Cold Warriors."

Allen's views on such questions come from two decades of academic and political experience in foreign and defense policy. He speaks from personal experience inside the White House at the beginning of the Nixon administration.

During the 1968 presidential campaign, Allen played the same role for Nixon that he is now playing for Reagan, and he followed the boss into office. But Nixon went outside his campaign circle to enlist Kissinger as his security adviser. Allen was named deputy adviser. Within a short time, he was out.

Sources who had a close view of that period say Kissinger could not tolerate Allen's direct access to Nixon. Some of them also suggest that Allen was more an operator than an analyst, and Kissinger wanted analysts to produce option papers for him.

Allen now says that it has been a mistake to put "a bunch of 35-year-olds in the White House" in control of experienced bureaucrats. He adds with a grin that in 1968 he was just 32 years old. By now he has matured to look older than his 44 years.

A Reagan administration would not replace people just for the sake of having new faces, Allen insisted. He mentioned — off the record — the names of some technocrats now in the Carter administration who should be kept as "national assets."

But a Reagan victory in November would bring into office "people you know, and who share your point of view," Allen said, in order to "try to establish a coherent policy."